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initiatives have been mainly driven by concern about the 
lower productivity of European companies in compari-
son with their United States competitors. Therefore, Eu-
ropean policy makers have advised member countries 
to strengthen their knowledge base in order to foster 
productivity and support economic growth.1 Yet, despite 
the substantial shifts in policies during the last two dec-
© The Author(s) 2018. Open Access: This article is distributed under the 
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unre-
stricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if chang-
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1 European Commission: Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Europe 2020 
Flagship Initiative Innovation Union, SEC(2010) 1161, 2010; European 
Commission: Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee and the Committee of the Regions, An Integrated Industrial Policy 
for the Globalisation Era, Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability 
at Centre Stage, SEC(2010) 1272, SEC(2010) 1276, 2010.
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Since the Lisbon European Council in 2000, the Euro-
pean Union has been working to improve its industrial 
and innovation policy, with the aim of turning the Euro-
pean economy into the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economic system in the world. Its 
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ades, the productivity gap between European countries 
and the US has not been signiﬁ cantly reduced. By 2016, 
the average worker across the 28 EU member states 
generated $47.70 (constant prices, 2010 PPPs) of GDP 
for every hour worked; in the US the equivalent ﬁ gure 
was $63.30; for comparison, in 2000 these ﬁ gures were 
$40.10 and $50.40, respectively.2 In addition to the EU’s 
widening productivity gap with the US, the entire world 
economy has entered a phase of low overall productiv-
ity growth in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Gor-
don was one of many prominent economists who wrote 
about this so-called “secular stagnation”, and he largely 
attributed it to fading technological opportunities.3 We 
posit that narrowing the EU’s productivity gap with re-
spect to the US may be even more problematic in times 
when declining technological opportunities reduce the 
overall potential for productivity gains. In addition, the 
EU industrial structure is much less high-tech intensive 
than that of the US, and this long-term structural effect 
can impact productivity. Moreover, the potential capac-
ity of the EU to effectively increase productivity within 
each industry, compared to the US, is a critical issue. Fi-
nally, within the EU, country heterogeneity might be piv-
otal in determining differences in terms of the productiv-
ity consequences of economic cohesion policies.4
Secular stagnation: Are there technological origins?
The past 20 years have seen a remarkable drop in the 
productivity growth rates for many Western econo-
mies. While the empirical observation of low productiv-
ity growth rates is well documented, some authors have 
raised the question of whether simple measurement is-
sues may be the main drivers of these declining growth 
rates. In particular, one concern is that customary pro-
ductivity measures do not appropriately reﬂ ect the ac-
tual productivity gains due to new products.5 However, 
in this respect, Syverson presents evidence indicating 
that the potential distorting effects of the measurement 
biases are not large enough to explain the slowdown 
in productivity growth.6 Thus, most researchers today 
2 OECD: Productivity statistics database, available at  http://www.
oecd.org/sdd/productivity-stats/.
3 R.J. G o rd o n : The Turtle’s Progress: Secular Stagnation Meets the 
Headwinds, in: C. Te u l i n g s , R. B a l d w i n  (eds.): Secular Stagnation: 
Facts, Causes and Cures, London 2014, CEPR Press.
4 If resources are directed largely towards the most excellent research 
proposals, as in Horizon 2020, the result will most likely be a con-
centration of funds in countries which already perform well. See R. 
F r i e t s c h , C. R a m m e r, T. S c h u b e r t : Heterogeneity of Innovation 
Systems in Europe and Horizon 2020, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 50, 
No. 1, 2015, pp. 9-13.
5 J. M o k y r : Secular stagnation? Not in your life, in: C. Te u l i n g s , R. 
B a l d w i n , op. cit.
6 C. S y v e r s o n : Challenges to Mismeasurement Explanations for the 
US Productivity Slowdown, NBER Working Paper No. 21974, 2016.
agree that the declining productivity growth rates are not 
illusionary and reﬂ ect a real phenomenon.
What are the causes of this declining productivity 
growth? A widespread view among macroeconomists 
attributes the causes of stagnation to monetary poli-
cies7 or abundant social welfare systems8. However, a 
more technology-centred view claims that the slowdown 
of productivity growth is largely the result of diminish-
ing technological opportunities.9 Indeed, this evidence 
is corroborated by Schubert and Neuhäusler’s econo-
metric evidence.10 For a panel of 11 OECD countries, 
they show that the ability to sustain productivity growth 
through capital investment declined over the period 
1993-2011. However, they also provide evidence that the 
effect of research and development (R&D) on produc-
tivity growth was almost unchanged throughout these 
years. All in all, given that the effect of embodied tech-
nological change has largely come to hold, there is little 
hope that productivity growth rates might return to “nor-
mal” after the economic crisis. Conversely, there is rel-
evant evidence that the productivity-enhancing effects 
of genuine research activities are not declining.
EU versus US: What are the causes of the transat-
lantic productivity gap?
The literature has pointed to many different causes to 
explain the origin of the productivity gap between Eu-
rope and the US.11 Researchers have assigned blame 
to, among other things, the quality of human capital, the 
rigidity of European labour markets, the role and diffu-
sion of ICTs,12 the importance of new managerial prac-
tices and organisational investments,13 and embodied 
technological change. Most of these explanations can 
7 L.H. S u m m e r s : Demand Side Secular Stagnation, in: American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 105, No. 5, 2015, pp. 60-65.
8 E.L. G l a e s e r : Secular Joblessness, in: C. Te u l i n g s , R. B a l d w i n , 
op. cit.
9 B. E i c h e n g re e n : Secular Stagnation: The Long View, in: American 
Economic Review, Vol. 105, No. 5, 2015, pp. 66-70; R.J. G o rd o n : 
Secular Stagnation: A Supply-Side View, in: American Economic Re-
view, Vol. 105, No. 5, 2015, pp. 54-59.
10 T. S c h u b e r t , P. N e u h ä u s l e r : Can Depleting Technological Oppor-
tunities Explain the Stagnation of Productivity? Panel Data Evidence 
for 11 OECD Countries, Studien zum deutschen Innovationssystem, 
No. 11-2018, Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Re-
search ISI, 2018.
11 R. O r t e g a - A rg i l é s , M. P i v a , M. V i v a re l l i : The Transatlantic Pro-
ductivity Gap: Is R&D the Main Culprit?, in: Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 47, No. 4, 2014, pp. 1342-1371.
12 G. B o n a n n o : ICT and R&D as Inputs or Efﬁ ciency Determinants? 
Analysing Italian Manufacturing Firms (2007-2009), in: Eurasian Busi-
ness Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2016, pp. 189-213.
13 A. D e l l a  M a l v a , E. S a n t a re l l i : Intellectual Property Rights, Dis-
tance to the Frontier, and R&D: Evidence from Microdata, in: Eurasian 
Business Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2016, pp. 1-24.
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be related to a revealed technological disadvantage in 
the EU.
In this regard, both at the aggregate and the microeco-
nomic level, R&D expenditures can be considered a 
good proxy of technological investment. Therefore, the 
gap in corporate R&D investment can be seen as one of 
the main culprits of the European lag in terms of produc-
tivity growth in comparison with the US.14 Indeed, in the 
last decade, corporate business expenditure on R&D in 
the EU has remained almost constant at approximately 
1.2% of GDP. Meanwhile, in the US, this ﬁ gure has ﬂ oat-
ed between 1.7% and 2.0%.
Some scholars have argued that the lower European 
R&D expenditure is mainly due to a structural composi-
tion effect, which appears because the R&D-intensive 
manufacturing and R&D-intensive service sectors are 
under-represented in the European economy in com-
parison to the US.15
Other authors have stressed the existence of an intrinsic 
effect, pointing out that European ﬁ rms have a general 
difﬁ culty in achieving productivity gains from their R&D 
investments.16 According to this view, EU ﬁ rms within 
each industrial sector are characterised by a lower R&D 
intensity in comparison with their US counterparts. In 
addition, Ortega-Argilés et al. argue that EU companies 
have a lower capacity for translating R&D investments 
into productivity gains than US ﬁ rms do.17
R&D champions in Europe and the US: Is there a 
persistent productivity gap?
Our recent empirical exercise on top R&D investors 
suggests that the issue is not just the amount of mon-
ey spent on R&D.18 Indeed, EU ﬁ rms are also less suc-
cessful in translating R&D investments into productivity 
14 M. O ’ M a h o n y, B. v a n  A r k  (eds.): EU Productivity and Competitive-
ness: An Industry Perspective, Can Europe Resume the Catching-up 
Process?, European Commission, Luxembourg 2003, Ofﬁ ce for Of-
ﬁ cial Publications of the European Communities; O. B l a n c h a rd : The 
Economic Future of Europe, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
Vol. 8, No. 1, 2004, pp. 3-26; M. R o g e r s : R&D and Productivity: Us-
ing UK Firm-level Data to Inform Policy, in: Empirica, Vol. 37, No. 3, 
2010, pp. 329-359.
15 A. M a t h i e u , B. v a n  P o t t e l s b e rg h e  d e  l a  P o t t e r i e : A Note on 
The Drivers of R&D Intensity, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6684, 2008; 
R. O r t e g a - A rg i l é s , A. B r a n d s m a : EU-US Differences in the Size 
of R&D Intensive Firms: Do They Explain the Overall R&D Intensity 
Gap?, in: Science and Public Policy, Vol. 37, No. 6, 2010, pp. 429-441.
16 H. E r k e n , F. v a n  E s : Disentangling the R&D Shortfall of the EU vis-
à-vis the US, Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2007-107, 2007.
17 See R. O r t e g a - A rg i l é s  et al., op. cit.
18 D. C a s t e l l a n i , M. P i v a , T. S c h u b e r t , M. V i v a re l l i : The Produc-
tivity Impact of R&D Investment: A Comparison between the EU and 
the US, IZA Discussion Papers No. 9937, 2016.
gains, receiving a smaller return on their investments 
than US businesses.
We use microdata on the top 1 112 R&D-spending com-
panies in the EU (504) and the US (608), in both manu-
facturing and services, between 2004 and 2012.19 De-
scriptive statistics show that, on average, R&D intensity 
and productivity are lower in EU companies than in US 
ﬁ rms. Moreover, as expected, they are larger in high-
tech industries than in middle- and low-tech ones. In 
our panel data analysis, we estimate each company’s 
productivity as a function of investments in R&D, physi-
cal capital, company size and industrial characteristics. 
Our results demonstrate that, for a US company, a ten 
per cent rise in R&D intensity yields a 2.7% increase 
in productivity. For EU ﬁ rms, the same investment in-
creases productivity by only approximately one per 
cent. The gap becomes even more interesting when we 
disentangle high-tech and middle- and low-tech sec-
tors: for high-tech US companies, a ten per cent rise 
in R&D intensity yields a 3.3% increase in productivity, 
while for high-tech EU ﬁ rms, the same investment in-
creases productivity by just 1.2%. When we turn to mid-
dle- and low-tech companies, the gap shrinks, although 
US companies still remain better able to translate R&D 
investments into productivity.
We also split the sample into two periods, before and 
after the global ﬁ nancial crisis. In 2004-08 the return on 
R&D spending for EU ﬁ rms was not quite two-thirds that 
of their US counterparts, while in 2009-12 it fell to less 
than half. Therefore, since the economic crisis, it seems 
EU companies are even less able to translate R&D in-
vestments into productivity gains compared to their US 
counterparts. However, it is also interesting to underline 
that EU businesses gain more from capital spending 
than those in the US: a ten per cent increase in physical 
capital investments yields a 1.3% productivity increase 
in the EU, versus 1.0% in the US. This result seems to be 
mainly driven by middle- and low-tech industries, where 
EU ﬁ rms gain a 2.2% productivity gain compared to 
1.6% for US companies. In a sense, productivity growth 
in European non-high-tech ﬁ rms is still heavily depend-
ent on investments in physical capital (embodied tech-
nological change).
In general, R&D has potentially a much higher impact 
on productivity. Across all companies in our sample, a 
ten per cent increase in R&D spending leads to a 1.8% 
19 The microdata used were provided by the Joint Research Centre-
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies of the European Com-
mission. The dataset is mainly based on the EU Industrial R&D Score-
board and aggregates information on top R&D spenders worldwide 
from 2004 until 2012.
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rise in productivity. In comparison, the same increase in 
physical capital spending boosts productivity by only 
1.1%.
On the whole, our results suggest that the transatlantic 
productivity divide can be explained by:
• a lower level of R&D investments by EU ﬁ rms com-
pared to their US counterparts
• a structural composition effect, which seems to be 
signiﬁ cant both in aggregate and within the high-tech 
sectors
• the presence of an intrinsic effect, i.e. the generally 
lower capacity of European ﬁ rms to translate R&D in-
vestments into productivity gains.
Furthermore, our results show that EU companies have 
been more affected by the economic crisis with regard 
to their capacity to translate R&D investments into pro-
ductivity. Indeed, the global economic crisis has wors-
ened the productivity gap between the EU and the US.
Challenges for European policy makers
Turning Europe into the most competitive knowledge-
based economy in the world is an ambitious goal. Key 
economic ﬁ gures suggest that the EU continues to fall 
further behind the US – currently the leading economy – 
rather than narrowing the gap. In this paper, we highlight 
that the EU faces the challenge of reducing its produc-
tivity gap in a period characterised by overall low poten-
tial for productivity growth. This makes the catching-up 
process even more difﬁ cult.
Focusing on the role played by R&D in the EU compared 
to its role in US, our empirical exercise provides robust 
evidence of both a “quantity effect” (relatively lower 
R&D spending by European ﬁ rms) and a “quality effect” 
(lower ability of European ﬁ rms to turn R&D spending 
into productivity gains). However, most policy attention 
has been devoted to the lower levels of R&D spending 
rather than the lower capabilities to make efﬁ cient use 
of it; for example, the EU set a target of increasing R&D 
investment to three per cent of GDP. Instead of primar-
ily focusing on the symptom (i.e. R&D investments that 
are perceived as too low), effective policies should take 
into account the reasons why EU ﬁ rms obtain less pro-
ductivity gains from their R&D investments compared to 
their US counterparts. To get the most out of R&D, EU 
ﬁ rms need to address the structural problems that re-
duce their ability to translate investment into productiv-
ity gains. The main cause might lie in some combination 
of available human capital and the organisational/mana-
gerial practices adopted (i.e. ﬁ rms with better-managed 
R&D departments might provide relevant incentives and 
conducive work environments to their researchers, who 
in turn can be more productive).
In a sense, identifying best practices – embodied by 
those EU ﬁ rms most successful at leveraging their R&D 
investments – would allow policy to be designed to foster 
knowledge transfer and learning between ﬁ rms. Moreo-
ver, this would enable EU funding programmes to more 
effectively promote excellence by favouring such best 
practices. Indeed, several authors have acknowledged 
that research and innovation support may become more 
effective in promoting growth and productivity by taking 
a more selective approach.20 Resources should be con-
centrated in promising high-tech ﬁ elds that could poten-
tially initiate and sustain the next phase of high produc-
tivity growth.
Although compelling, policies redirecting resources 
to the most effective uses will unavoidably result in a 
tendency to concentrate resources in scientiﬁ c organi-
sations, ﬁ rms, sectors and, eventually, countries that 
already perform well in research and innovation. If the 
major concern to be remedied is the poor average/ag-
gregate performance of the EU in comparison to the US, 
greater selectiveness in the allocation of support for in-
novation circumvents the problem of low effectiveness 
in some parts of Europe rather than addressing it. How-
ever, while such a strategy may be effective in increasing 
the average returns per euro spent, it may come at the 
high cost of lower European cohesion.
20 R. Ve u g e l e r s , M. C i n c e r a : How to Turn on the Innovation Growth 
Machine in Europe, in: Intereconomics, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2015, pp. 4-9.
